Permanent Monitoring Panel -
Mitigation of Terrorist Acts
Members of the Panel:
Chairman:
Richard L. Garwin (USA)
Members and Associate Members:
KDiego Buriot (France); Vasiliy Krivokhizha (Russia); Sally Leivesley* (UK);
Ramamurti Rajaraman, Annette Sobel (USA); Friedrich Steinhaeusler (Austria);
Richard Wilson (USA);
[in process of augmentation]
(Associate PMP Members are a community of scientists who provide support and
expertise for the working of the Permanent Monitoring Panel. The designation
"*" identifies "co-ordinators" who have agreed to assist the Chair in organization
and conduct of the PMP)
Summary of the Emergency
While the history of terrorist acts goes back many centuries, 'terrorism' as we
understand it developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The latter
half of the 20th century saw increasing effectiveness and sophistication, not
least during the Cold War period when various conflicts were given tacit or direct
support by the USA and USSR as they sought to gain advantage in their conflict
with each other. Some of these terrorist campaigns continued or found new focus
in the post-communist era, but the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent
developments focused the attention of the contemporary world on this issue in a
very particular way, not least because of the response of the USA and the
resultant impact of its so-called 'War on Terror' on the structure and functioning
of global society.
Priorities in dealing with the Emergency, and the WFS response
The World Federation of Scientists immediately reacted to '9/11' as it became
known by beginning its consideration of the subject, first in its Annual Session
in 2002, and then by establishing a Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism at
its next Annual Session in August 2003. The Permanent Monitoring Panel on
Terrorism was established with the objective of identifying scientific and
'do-able' solutions to contain and possibly eliminate the growing scourge
and its impact.
The PMPT brought together a group of eminent scientists and scholars in regular
sessions in Erice each May, and it quickly became clear that while the technical
aspects of mitigating terrorist attacks particularly benefited from the expertise
and research of the applied physical sciences, addressing the motivations of
those who engaged in terrorism required especial input from the applied social
sciences, and two sub-groups emerged dealing with Mitigation and Motivations.
These two groups view the problem from different angles, but the two approaches
are entirely complementary, and neither can succeed in resolving the problem alone.
Neither group has addressed police work or intelligence that might play a role in
reducing the overall impact of terrorism, regarding this topic as inappropriate
for the WFS.
By 2007 the work had evolved to the point with these two strands of work - the
Mitigation of Terrorism and the Motivations for Terrorism - that it was decided
with the approval of the President of WFS to have two PMPT's addressing these
different elements, but cooperating closely.
The Permanent Monitoring Panel on the Motivations for Terrorism, chaired by John,
Lord Alderdice (U.K), continues with the same objectives as before, monitoring
research that is being conducted, organising scientific workshops to channel
research efforts and reconcile conflicting views on scientific and related ethical
issues, helping disseminate relevant scientific data and information, developing
recommendations for use by governments and international agencies, elaborating
project proposals to conduct research in collaboration with scientists and others
from relevant countries, and seeking to operationalize the results of scientific
research in the cause of deeper understanding and for the purposes of the cause
of peace rather than war.
The Permanent Monitoring Panel on the Mitigation of Terrorist Acts has considered
nuclear and biological megaterrorism, first to determine and to explain the
magnitude of the hazard and then, in the case of biological megaterrorism, to
identify the great benefit potentially available in the case of a terrorist-initiated
pandemic of contagious disease such as smallpox by non-pharmaceutical interventions
such as hand sanitation, improvised masks, air purification, use of household
bleach - all to reduce the reproduction factor R of the disease from one generation
of illness to the next "serial interval." Evidently, rapid development, production
and use of an appropriate vaccine for the disease will minimize the serious economic
and social burden of draconian public health measures.
The PMP Terrorism-Mitigation will continue to maintain an overview of the capability
in principle and in practice of detecting the flow of fissile material that might be
used by terrorists to build nuclear weapons; of the monitoring capability for the
early detection and identification of disease that might be terrorist-induced or for
that matter a natural outbreak, taking into account that terrorist-induced disease
might have many foci. Mitigation involves rapid assessment of the hazard - e.g., the
extent and nature of radiological contamination in case of the dispersal of radioactive
materials, to minimize further contamination and exposure of the population, as well
as the tools and procedure to decontaminate where possible and warranted. The response
involves not only systems analysis informed by physics and chemistry, but notably the
hard work of defining and sharing "best practices" and of sketching materials that
would most effectively limit the damage from a pathogen.
That this effort has much in common with what might most effectively counter an avian
flu pandemic is regarded as a virtue, because it increases both motivation and value
of the PMP's activity. But identifying best practices and materials to be stockpiled
by families, businesses, schools, and churches is only the beginning of the solution;
the world's structure for public health is far from adequate to distribute and implement
such initiatives. Solutions must be tempered by awareness of their cost and of the lack
of resources in many societies - problems worsened because megaterrorism will not be a
daily occurrence, so that training and practice are not likely to be at a high level.
Radioactive contamination from a radiological dispersal device (conventional explosive
or perhaps an aerosol generator fed by a solution of radioactive material) must be
assessed, prepared analyses and plans consulted, advice communicated to the public,
and decontamination of people and places initiated on a suitable time scale.
It is urgent to have tested communications means and information packages ready for
distribution within minutes to avoid panic that may worsen the consequence of a terrorist
act. Meetings at Erice have included heads of fire and public safety departments from
abroad and could well involve officials from universities and businesses who are tackling
the difficult problems of what to do in emergencies, and how to get people to do it.
What to do, what to say, and how and when to say it is a vast problem that will be
addressed at the meeting of the PMPT-Mitigation in Erice May 27-28, 2008. The PMP on
Motivation of Terrorism will meet at the same time, and close collaboration between
the Mitigation and Motivation groups will continue.
Some Statements, Papers and Reports (online)
Papers and Publications
- World Scientific Publications -the International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary
Emergencies Series - The 29th Session - Erice May 2003 - The Cultural Emergency:
Focus on Terrorism
- World Scientific Publications - the International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary
Emergencies Series - The 31st Session - Erice May 2005 - The Cultural Emergency:
Focus on Terrorism
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